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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 970100-CA

VASSILIOS CHALKIDIS,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for distribution of a
controlled substance (cocaine) within 1000 feet of a public park,
a first degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Has defendant preserved his claim that the trial court's

jury instruction defining ^public place" should have conformed to
the definition of that term as articulated in a civil case
construing the Landowner Liability Act?
"With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has
been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time

on appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of E d u c . 797 P. 2d 412,
413 (Utah 1990).

Moreover, if a party leads the trial court into

committing an error, that party cannot take advantage of the
error on appeal.
2.

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).

Does the term "public park" as used in the penalty

enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(v)
include a neighborhood park located within a subdivision of 366
homes?
The proper interpretation of "public park" as used in a
particular statute presents a question of law, reviewed on appeal
for correctness.

See, e.g.. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357

(Utah 1993); State v. Shipler. 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App.
1994) .
3.

Was the evidence that Gazebo Park was a public park for

purposes of the enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(5)(v) sufficient to support the jury's verdict?
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the
crime."

State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoting

State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on
2

other grounds. Stfrte v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)
increases the penalty by one degree for a felony that would
otherwise have been less than a first degree felony if the
criminal act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or
secondary school or on the grounds of any of
those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school
or post-secondary institution or on the
grounds of any of those schools or
institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building,
park, stadium, or other structure or grounds
which are, at the time of the act, being used
for an activity sponsored by or through a
school or institution under Subsections
(5) (a) (i) and (ii) ;
(iv) in or on the grounds of a pre-school or
child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade,
or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility,
stadium, arena, theater, movie house,
playhouse, or parking lot or structure
adjacent thereto;
(vii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure,
facility, or grounds included in Subsections
(5)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of distribution of a
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public park, a first
degree felony (R. 2-3). He was tried before a jury and convicted
as charged (R. 164-66).

The trial court sentenced him to five

years to life in the Utah State Prison, to run concurrently with
two other prison sentences; recommended credit for time served;
and ordered that he could be released to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for deportation proceedings (R. 253).
This timely appeal followed (R. 254).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was arrested after he sold cocaine to a
confidential informant at his home in Lake View Heights, a North
Ogden subdivision of 366 homes (R. 4, 274, 283). Defendant's
home was located just across the street from Gazebo Park, the
largest of three neighborhood recreation areas within the housing
development (R. 275, 287, 296). The Lake View Heights
Homeowners' Association, in which membership was mandatory for
all homeowners, owned Gazebo Park, which contained playground
equipment, tennis courts, and picnic facilities (R. 287, 295,
297).

The park was freely accessed by the more than 1000 members

of the public who lived in Lake View Heights (R. 284). The
4

subdivision was policed by the North Ogden city police department
(R. 280).
These are the only facts relevant to defendant's appeal,
which focuses on whether Gazebo Park was a "public park" for
purposes of statutorily enhancing the penalty for distribution of
a controlled substance from a second degree felony to a first
degree felony.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly instructed
the jury on the meaning of "public" as that term is used in the
phrase "public park" in the drug enhancement statute.

He

believes that the trial court should have used the definition

articulated in Perrine v, Kennecott Mining CcrPt, 9ii P.2d 1290
(Utah 1996}, a civil case construing the Landowner Liability Act.
Because defendant asserted a different position in the trial
court -- that the jury ought not be given any instruction at all
because the term was so commonly understood -- the argument he
now asserts on appeal "smacks of invited error," and should not
be considered.

Pfrygong vT Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah),

cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
Second, in any event, the definition of "public place"
articulated in jury instruction #28 correctly states the law.
5

It

does not run afoul of the plain language of the statute and is
strongly supported by both underlying legislative intent and
public policy.

Clearly, the law was intended to protect children

from the influences and obvious dangers posed by persons who deal
drugs in locations likely to be frequented by children.

To

insulate criminals who deal drugs in parks that belong to
homeowners' associations but are nonetheless intended for use by
neighboring children would contravene the fundamental purpose of
the statute.
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
For a jury to construe Gazebo Park as a public park was not
inherently improbable.

All the jury had to do was look at how

the park actually functioned.

Substantial numbers of people, all

members of the public, frequented the park; children were
attracted by the playground equipment to play there; no locked
gates or fences kept people out; and the city police patrolled
the park.
For all of these reasons, defendant's conviction for
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a
public park should be affirmed.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT QNE
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE CLAIM THAT
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON THE
MEANING OF *PUBLIC PLACE" SHOULD
HAVE CONFORMED TO THE PERRINE
DEFINITION OF THAT TERM
Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury on the meaning of "public," as that term is
used in the phrase "public park" in the drug enhancement statute.
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (v). Because the court did not
instruct the jury in conformity with the definition adopted in
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996),
defendant believes he was prejudiced and that this Court should
vacate the enhancement and reduce his conviction to a second
degree felony (Br. of App. at 18-20).
The law is well settled that a defendant must specifically
state to the trial court the same grounds for objection to
evidence that he presents on appeal.
689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984).

See, e.g.. State v. Davis.

In the context of jury instructions,

the general rule is that *[n]o party may assign as error any
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the

7

matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection."1
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c).
In this instance, defendant made a clear and specific
objection in the trial court to jury instruction #28, which
defined "public place." He stated:
Your Honor, at this time I would object to
the inclusion of the definitions of "public"
in the jury instructions based on the fact
that the statute itself, which includes the
Controlled Substance Act, does not itself
have a definition of public. And that,
basically, in the instructions -- they were
added to the jury instructions. Those
definitions of public came from other
statutes, which it would appear from the
language of those statutes that those
definitions were only for that statute
itself, or that portion of the statute -- for
instance, the disorderly conduct statute, the
pornography statute.
I'd argue that the jury, itself, could have
easily made a decision of simply what public
means just because it's a very common term
and didn't need any statutory instruction on
that. And that's the basis of my objection,
Your Honor.
(R. 262 or addendum A ) .
Defendant, then, wanted no instruction at all on the
definition of "public place."

He articulated the strategy

1

The rule makes an exception for cases involving "manifest
injustice," which defendant has not asserted here. Utah R. Crim.
P. 19(c).
8

underlying this position when he next objected to the lesserincluded-offense instruction:
I object at this time to the inclusion of the
lesser included offense. The State has filed
an Information in this case and did not file
it in the alternative, and the addition of
the lesser included offense substantially
prejudiced the defendant's case by the fact

that we were looking forward to the -- going
to the jury just on the first degree
felony
issuef with the inclusion
of the enhancement,
because of the fact that I do think that we
have a very good issue with regards to
whether or not that is a public park.
Obviously, if the jury doesn't find it to be
a public park, they could not find a first
degree felony and the defendant would have
been acquitted in that instance. And that's
why we're objecting at this time.
(R. 262-63)(emphasis added).

Thus, defendant's two specific

objections to the jury instructions were rooted in a single,
clear strategy.

He believed that if the jury had only the

enhanced first degree felony to consider and could interpret
"public park" in any way it chose, it would determine that Gazebo
Park was not "public" and so acquit defendant.
Defendant's strategy is further highlighted by his
subsequent silence when the trial court, after explaining its
rationale for giving jury instruction #28, raised the Perrine
case sua sponte and mused over its definition of "public" within

9

a civil context (R. 266-67).2

The state then mentioned that the

issue had been briefed at the preliminary hearing.

In response,

although defendant acknowledged that the state had done an
''exhaustive search" of the law, he did not indicate even the
slightest interest in a jury instruction based on Perrine's
definition of "public" (R. 268).3

Defendant's last opportunity

to raise the matter came at the end of the hearing when the court
asked defendant if there was "any further matter of business" (R.
269).

Defendant replied that there was not.

Throughout the

hearing on objections to jury instructions, then, defendant
remained consistent in his strategy that a jury instruction on
the meaning of "public" should not be given.
Given these undisputed facts, defendant's argument on appeal
that the trial court should have given an instruction based on
Perrine runs afoul of the invited error doctrine.

"The doctrine

2

In Perrine. the Supreme Court construed the Landowner
Liability Act, granting immunity under the Act only to those
landowners who opened their property for recreational purposes to
all members of the general public. It was in this civil context,
with an articulated policy-driven result in mind, that the court
interpreted the meaning of the term "public." See Perrine v.
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1996).
3

Nor, when defendant objected to jury instruction #28, did
he offer a fall-back position of an instruction based on Perrine.
10

of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at
trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'"

State v. Perdue.

813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting State v. Henderson.
792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).

The purpose of the invited error

doctrine is to discourage a defendant in a criminal case from
inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it in the record
"as a form of appellate insurance against an adverse sentence."
State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989); accord Dunn.
850 P.2d at 1220 (noting the rule "discourages parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a
hidden ground for reversal on appeal").
Because defendant asserted one position at trial -- that no
instruction should have been given -- and then, when that
strategy failed to produce the desired outcome, he asserted
another contrary position on appeal, his claim should be
rejected. "This inconsistency smacks of invited error, which is
'procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor.'"

Parsons v.

BamSfi, 871 P.2d at 520 (quoting State vt Tillman# 750 P.2d 546,
560-61 (Utah 1987)); flf. State v, PyllocK, 791 P.2d 155, 159
(Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)(defendants not
entitled to both benefit of not objecting at trial and benefit of
11

objecting on appeal).4
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THE MEANING OF *PUBLIC
PARK" AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE
To the extent that defendant's argument constitutes a
challenge to the correctness of the instruction that was given,
it must fail because the trial court accurately instructed the
jury on the meaning of Mpublic" as that term is used in the drug

4

Similarly, defendant argues on appeal that the trial
court committed plain error by submitting the enhanced charge, a
first degree felony, to the jury (Br. of App. at 15-18).
However, at trial, defendant explicitly stated that he wanted the
criminal charge against him to be submitted to the jury as a
first degree felony. Indeed, submission of the matter as a first
degree felony constituted the very heart of his trial strategy.
As defendant explained when he objected to the jury instructions
defining "public place" and outlining a lesser-included offense:
[W]e were looking forward to the -- going to
the jury just on the first degree felony
issue, with the inclusion of the enhancement,
because of the fact that I do think that we
have a very good issue with regards to
whether or not that is a public park.
Obviously, if the jury doesn't find it to be
a public park, they could not find a first
degree felony and the defendant would have
been acquitted in that instance.
(R. 263).
Because defendant himself wanted the matter to be submitted
to the jury as a first degree felony, he cannot now argue on
appeal that the trial court erred by doing precisely as he
wished. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1220.
12

enhancement statute.

Jury instruction #28 provided:

Public place means any place to which the
public or a substantial group of the public
has access.
A public place includes, but is not limited
to streets, highways, and the common areas of
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office
buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(R. 215).
On appeal, this Court's inquiry centers on whether this
instruction accurately stated the law.

State v. Gallegos. 849

P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993) . Accordingly, this Court gives no
deference to the trial court's determination.
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

State v. Deli. 861

Once this Court determines that the

instruction is accurate, however, its inquiry ends.

Id.

The

precise content and specificity of jury instructions is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court.

State v. Aly, 782 P.2d

549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
To determine whether the jury instruction accurately defined
the term "public" as used in the drug enhancement statute, a
reviewing court applies rules of statutory construction to the
statute whose meaning is in question:
"'The primary rule of statutory
interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'"
13

Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853
P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)(quoting Reeves v.
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)).
Although we generally rely on the plain
language rule of statutory construction, id.
at 879, we note that an equally important
rule of statutory construction is that a
statute should be construed as a whole, with
all of its provisions construed to be
harmonious with each other and with the
overall legislative objective of the statute
(citations omitted).
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).
The term "public" or the phrase "public park" as used in the
Utah Controlled Substances Act is defined neither in the Act
itself nor in any Utah case.5

The definition of "public place"

found in Black's Law Dictionary, however, sheds light on the
plain meaning of the phrase.

In pertinent part, that definition

provides that a public place
is not necessarily a place devoted solely to
the uses of the public, but a place which is
in point of fact public rather than private,
a place visited by many persons and usually
5

That the meaning of the term was not unambiguous from the
plain language of the enhancement provision is evidenced by the
dispute in this case: the state asked for one definition, the
court conjectured about the application of another, and defendant
at trial wanted neither. Under the circumstances, the trial
court properly clarified the matter and provided guidance to the
jury on the meaning of the term. See State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d
232, 238 (Utah 1992)(trial court has duty to instruct the jury on
law applicable to facts).
14

accessible to the neighboring public (e.g. a
park or public beach). Also, a place in
which the public has an interest as affecting
the safety, health, morals, and welfare of
the community.
Black's Law Dictionary 1107 (5th ed. 1979).

The definition of

"public place" in jury instruction #28 plainly comports with this
definition.

Both emphasize that the use is by "many persons" or

"a substantial group of the public."

Both seem to focus on a

functional assessment of "publicness" -- that is, the Black's
definition refers to "a place which is in point of fact public"
and jury instruction #28 refers to "any place" to which there is
access.
Moreover, the intent of the legislature in originally
enacting and later expanding the enhancement provision of the
Controlled Substances Act supports the correctness of the
definition adopted by the trial court.6

See State v. Scieszka.

897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah App. 1995)("[A] fundamental rule of
statutory construction requires that a statute 'be looked at in
its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought
to be accomplished.'")(citation omitted).

6

The enhancement

Defendant has ignored both the legislative intent
underlying the enhancement statute as well as its related public
policy. When these two factors are taken into account, the
inapplicability of Perrine becomes apparent.
15

provision of the Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1986
and subsequently amended in 1991 "to expand the number of
locations where youth congregate to which the enhanced penalties
will be applied."

Statement of Sen. Lyle Hillyard on H.B. 176,

49th Legislature, Feb. 27, 1991, Tape #47 (on file with the Utah
House of Representatives).
The public policy underlying the statutory purpose has been
recognized by both of Utah's appellate courts.

Penalties for

distribution of drugs are enhanced when they occur within 1000
feet of locations frequented by children in order to "'protect
the public health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from
the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug
transactions occur on or near a school ground [or other places
frequented by children].'"

State v. Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 149

(Utah App. 1996)(quoting State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 503 (Utah
1989)).

There can be no real dispute that the overarching intent

of the enhancement statute is the creation of drug-free zones "to
protect children from the influence of drug-related activity."
State v. Strombercr. 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App. 1989), cert.
d£Hi£d, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Given the unambiguous legislative intent and public policy
underlying the enhancement provision, defendant's reliance on
16

Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996),
simply makes no sense.

In Perrine. the Utah Supreme Court

focused on the legislature's intent in enacting the Landowner
Liability Act, which was "*to encourage public and private owners
of land to make land and water areas available to the public for
recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons
entering thereon for those purposes.'"
Code Ann. § 57-14-1).

Id. at 1292 (quoting Utah

The legislature's explicit intent was

central to the court's defining "public" as including all members
of the general public.

In the context of the enhancement

statute, however, the Perrine definition would serve only to
undercut both legislative intent and public policy.
More appropriately, the state at trial, rather than
resorting to an unrelated civil statute, proposed a definition of
"public place" used in other analogous criminal provisions,
specifically the disorderly conduct statute, Utah Code Ann. §769-102(2)(same wording as instruction #28), and the prostitution
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(3)(same as first sentence of
instruction #28).
The disorderly conduct provision prohibits conduct which
"creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition" in a
public place or "conduct intending to cause public inconvenience,
17

annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102(1) (a)-(b) (1995).

On its face, the

statute is aimed at criminalizing certain conduct when it occurs
in public places, presumably in order to protect members of the
public from that conduct. Analogously, the enhancement
provisions of section 58-37-8(5) are aimed at more severely
penalizing those who commit drug-related crimes in locations
frequented by children, also to protect the public and, in
particular, its most vulnerable members, children.

The trial

court correctly noted these similarities when it evaluated the
applicability of the disorderly conduct definition of "public
place" to the enhancement statute (R. 264).
The definition embodied in jury instruction #28 comports
with both the intent of the legislature in enacting the
enhancement statute and similar provisions elsewhere in the
criminal code.

In contrast, a narrower definition, such as the

one now advocated by defendant, would exclude Gazebo Park, or any
other park located within a planned residential urban
development.

In essence, the court would be choosing to insulate

from increased liability those drug-dealers who were fortunate
enough to live in or have access to parks in newer, upscale
housing developments.

Clearly, such a result would be untenable
18

and in direct conflict with both legislative intent and public
policy-

See State v. Martinez. 896 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah App.

1995)(asserting statutory interpretations which render some part
of a provision "nonsensical or absurd" are to be avoided)
(quoting Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah
1980)) .
POINT THREE
THE EVIDENCE THAT GAZEBO PARK WAS A
PUBLIC PARK WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
Defendant argues that the evidence before the jury that
Gazebo Park was a "public park" was insufficient to support his
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance within 1000
feet of a public park (Br. of App. at 11-14).

The fatal flaw in

defendant's argument is his mistaken reliance on the definition
of "public" articulated in Perrine. When the evidence is
properly viewed in the context of jury instruction #28, the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is quite
clear.
An appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence following a criminal conviction is a limited one.
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

"Where there is

any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn
19

from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can
be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we
will sustain the verdict."

State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 285

(Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).

A conviction

will be reversed on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence
is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the crime.

State v.

Petree. 659 P.2d 443# 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other
grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
In the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the jury
had before it the following evidence.

Lake View Heights is a

North Ogden subdivision of 366 homes in which ua large number of
children" live (R. 283, 298-99).

Conservatively, at least 1000

people reside in Lake View Heights (R. 284). Gazebo Park, the
largest of three parks within the confines of Lake View Heights,
is outfitted with a small area of children's playground
equipment, including swings, tires, and sand (R. 275, 287).
Plainly, the presence of playground equipment in the park
evidences an intent to attract children there to play.

In

addition, the park contains a gazebo with picnic tables, some
grassy areas with trees, and tennis courts (R. 287). While signs
at the park read: "Private Property. Lake View Heights Homeowner
20

Association, Members Only," the only area of controlled access in
the park is the tennis courts (R. 276, 296) .7 Everyone who lives
in Lake View Heights and, consequently, belongs to the Lake View
Heights homeowners' association, has access to all park
facilities (R. 297). Like any other park in Ogden, Gazebo Park
is patrolled by the North Ogden city police department (R. 280).
Without dispute, more than 1000 people, including many
children, had access to Gazebo Park.

A jury could thus

reasonably infer that, despite the signage at this neighborhood
recreation area, a ''substantial group of the public" -- all of
the residents of Lake View Heights -- were welcome to use it.8
Further, because "the common areas of . . . apartment houses
[and] office buildings" are public places, the jury could also
reasonably infer that the common recreation area of a subdivision
is also a public place. £££ Jury instruction #28. Thus,

7

Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to establish that
the park was open to the public, despite the posted sign, since
"the park was accessible to and, in fact, used by many of the
children in the neighborhood." See United States v. Horsley. 56
F.3d 50, 52 (11th Cir. 1995) (addressing whether a playground
that had posted signs indicating it was private was nonetheless
"open to the public" under 21 U.S.C. § 860).
8

Certainly these individuals did not give up their status
as members of the public simply by virtue of buying homes in this
particular subdivision.
21

applying the facts before the jury to the law as articulated in
jury instruction #28, the jury had sufficient evidence from which
to conclude that Gazebo Park had sufficient indicia of being a
"public park" to come within the ambit of the enhancement
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
first degree felony conviction for distribution of a controlled
substance (cocaine) within 1000 feet of a public park.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J£_ day of June, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

(Objections to Jury Instructions)
THE COURT:

We agreed that we would

make the objections on the record at this time, so go
ahead, Mr* Boyle.
MR. BOYLE:

Your Honor, at this time

I would object to the inclusion of the definitions of
••public" in the jury instructions based on the fact
that the statute itself, which includes the
Controlled Substance Act, does not itself have a
definition of public.
instructions ~
instructions.

And that, basically, in the

they were added to the jury
Those definitions of public came from

other statutes, which it would appear from the
language of those statutes that those definitions
were only for that statute itself, or that portion of
the statute —

for instance, the disorderly conduct

statute, the pornography statute.
I'd argue that the jury, itself, could have
easily made a decision of simply what public means
just because it's a very common term and didn't need
any statutory instruction on that.

And that's the

basis of my objection, Your Honor.

the —

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BOYLE:

Moreover, Your Honor,

I object at this time to the inclusion of the
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lesser included offense.

The State has filed an

Information in this case and did not file it in the
alternative, and the addition of the lesser included
offense substantially prejudiced the defendant's case
by the fact that we were looking forward to the —
going to the jury just on the first degree felony
issue, with the inclusion of the enhancement# because
of the fact that I do think that we have a very good
issue with regards to whether or not that is a public
park.

Obviously, if the jury doesn't find it to be a

public parkf they could not find a first degree
felony and the defendant would have been acquitted in
that instance.

And that's why we're objecting at

this time.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Any further

MR. BOYLE:

Just one.

objections?
For the

record, Your Honor, if the Court could please state
its reason for consistently overruling my objections
with regards to hearsay when the officers were
testifying to not only what the defendant might have
said, but what the confidential informant had said,
or possibly a female that was also talked about in
the transcript.
THE COURT:

It's very easy.

They

1GT
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are not being admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted.

In other words, their testimony of what

the individual said, they were not trying to prove a
fact or the truth of what the people were saying.
They were just stating what they were hearing coming
over the microphone.

all mine.

And that#s clearly not hearsay.

MR. BOYLE:

Okay.

THE COURT:

The pleasure is almost

Let's see, I —

Boyle, that this —

Thank you.

it occurred to me, Mr.

the issue of the public park has

kind of put you between a rock and a hard place.

The

Court has instructed the jury on what a public place
is and has instructed them based on a provision out
of the disorderly conduct section which is 76-9-102,
subsection (2), and that section does specifically
state that this definition applies to this section,
which would imply that it's not a universal kind of
definition.
I instructed the jury in that regard, frankly,
because I felt like the intent of the legislature in
protecting the public would have been identical in
the two sections, and I felt like that would be a
good reason to do that.
of —

And I recognize because

because of the position that your client finds

himself in, wanting to have the issue submitted just
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on the issue of the public park issue, it kind of
puts you in a bad position to make a motion for a
directed verdict on the issue of the public

—

whether it's a public park or not a public park under
the provisions of the drug section —

Title 58,

isn't

it?
What I'm beating around the bush about is that
you have not made a motion to —

for a directed

verdict, but in view of the circumstances of the case
I'm not —

I am not going to —

I am going to allow

you to consider a motion .for a judgment N.O.V. based
on the concept of whether this is a public or private
park.
In other words, I'm not completely certain
that I've instructed the jury correctly on that
issue, so I suppose I'm reserving the prerogative of
reconsidering or revisiting that issue, depending on
what the jury verdict is.

Thank you.

MR. BOYLE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I would assume that I would make that when you get
the verdict back?
THE COURT:

Well, in order to make

that motion, you see, you would had to have made a
motion for a directed verdict, and, of course, you
haven't done that -- and I think for certain

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 399-8510

965
*

6

strategic reasons.

I recognize the fact that that

would have been a difficult philosophical position.
But I'm not convinced —
some of the other authorities.

I/ve been looking at
I just pulled up Utah

Law On Disc and was looking at some cases, and the
Supreme Court, in a fairly recent case —

and this

was sitting way back down in the deep, dark recesses
of my mind.

It was a civil case where somebody was

injured in a public park.

And the State had ~

one

of the defenses that was raised was a provision where
landowners, if they voluntarily allow people to use
their property for recreational purposes, are not
liable.

It/s almost across the board.

And the

Supreme Court, in that case, spent a lot of time
talking about what is —
is private and

what is public land and what

~
MR. BOYLE:

That was the Kennecott

THE COURT;

Pardon me?

MR. BOYLE:

Was it the Kennecott

THE COURT:

No.

case, wasn't it?

case?

remember.

It's —

I don't

It came down maybe a month or two ago.

It's fairly new law*
But at any rate, they spent a lot of time
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talking about the distinctions.

They were using the

distinction the other way in that case:
is this private property?

Is this —

They seemed to feel that

that would apply more to private property than it
would to public, so they were talking about the
distinction between public and private.

And their

definition of what was public property was a good
deal broader than the definition we've used here.
And the definition that they used is that there's a
right of general access to public property, as
opposed to ~

which would be almost —

which would

almost implicitly make this a private park as opposed
to a public park.
And I recognize that that's probably not a.
good analogy because, in fact, it's, you know, an
entirely different kind of lawsuit.

It's civil, and

we do have these criminal definitions that are a good
deal more narrow, but it's something I think I would
like to take a look at, depending on how the jury
comes back.
MR. SAUNDERS:
Honor.

That's fine, Your

For the record, this is not new.

Mr. Boyle

and I briefed the issue before the Court on
preliminary hearing and looked for applicable law.
This was the closest thing we could find.
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So effort has been made to try to find out if
there is a definition that specifically applies to
this type of case.

There is not and those

definitions that we've supplied to the Court are

thosa we felt

are the most

appropriate.

MR. BOYLE:
being modest.

Your Honor, the State's

In fact, they did an exhaustive search

to try to find out what public actually means.
You looked all the way to New York, didn't
you?

Those two cases in New York?
MR. SAUNDERS:

The ones that said if

a neighboring community has access?
MR. BOYLE:

Was that the New York

THE COURT:

Well, it's certainly an

cases?

interesting question.

You know, it's a close

question when you consider do we —
common law was that you —

you know, the

that you interpret

criminal statutes strictly, although our criminal
code says, you know, that it's to be interpreted not
as the common law strictly, but to best effectuate
its purpose.

And that's what I was kind of kicking

around in my mind.

Do we interpret it strictly, use

a strict interpretation of what is public, or can we
use a comparable statute?
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Well, it's an interesting question.
won't have to worry about it.

Maybe we

At any rate, any

further matter of business?
MR. BOYLE:

That was it, Your Honor,

THE COURT:

All right.

Court's in

recess until the jury returns.
(WHEREUPON, at this time objections to the
jury instructions conclude.)
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